James Matthew Mac Donald’s PhD Dissertation
Politics of the Personal in the Old North State: Griffith Rutherford in Revolutionary North Carolina
Mac Donald, James Matthew, "Politics of the personal in the old north state: Griffith Rutherford in Revolutionary North Carolina" (2006). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 3625. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/3625
Chapter Three - The Cherokee Expedition
Commentary - In this document, the Chickamauga are referred to as the Lower Town Cherokee.
Attacks on settlers began in the spring of 1776; with intermittent raids on isolated families scattered around the frontier. News of the violence terrified residents in western counties, as far east as the Moravian communities in Surry County.1 The reports filled the Moravians with tension in the spring of 1776. At that time, news arrived in Salem that residents near the Holston River were fleeing the area or gathering together in a defensive stance. This action could not have been an easy task considering the mountains received six inches of snow during the early part of April.2 The attacks became more widespread and coordinated in July, as forts on the Holston River became targets to the Cherokee. Warriors also moved as far east as Crooked Creek, near present day Rutherfordton.3
Rumor and conjecture filled the correspondence of the people of North Carolina. With the Carolinas already threatened by an invading British force at Charleston, it made perfect sense to many that the British would naturally try to create chaos in the colony by inciting Cherokee allies. This was the general opinion in the east, as one man blamed the “wicked and diabolical superintendent Cameron who resides in the over Hill Cherokee Towns.”4As discussed in the earlier chapter, British officials did not approve of these attacks, but younger Cherokee warriors refused to heed their advice.5
At his home outside of Salisbury, Griffith Rutherford heard of the news sometime in late June or early July. The first letters exchanged with civilian authorities begin in earnest during July. In late June, the Council set a tone for dealings with the Cherokee. Their letter to Rutherford repeated their suspicion that agents of Great Britain provoked the Cherokee into attacking white settlements. But at the same time, they urged caution. “It is the Intention of this Council that you Cautiously avoid and to the utmost of your power endeavor to prevent the Inhabitants of this colony from committing any Depredations on the Indians.”6
The Committee asked that Rutherford contain not only himself, but the settlers in the western areas, no small task considering most settlers would naturally want a concerted retaliation from the state. But Rutherford was reminded not to act unless the Indians extended their attack across the boundary line, east of the mountains. This commitment to restraint was also accompanied by the Council’s promise that everything was being done to secure lead sent to Salisbury by way of Cross Creek, present day Fayetteville.7
The words of the council did little to alleviate the tension in the Salisbury district. Rutherford continued to ask for instructions on how to handle matters, telling the Council that their instructions were not explicit enough. And considering Halifax is over200 miles from Salisbury, the General had cause for his anxiety about the council being out of touch with matters in the west. He felt limited in acting since he could not pursue war parties out of his district. The General wanted to deploy ranging parties, men who could quickly move and counter Cherokee attacks. In the meantime, Rutherford asked the council to consider writing the governments of both South Carolina and Virginia in an effort to launch a combined expedition. This would in Rutherford’s minden sure “a finel Destruction of the Cherroce Nation.” To finish the letter, he thanked the Council for their work in getting him much needed supplies, which were beginning to drift into Salisbury. 8
Rutherford’s call for coordinated action is just what the leaders of North Carolina had in mind. Already the Council of Safety drafted letters to the leaders of the neighboring states with the intent to send a three-pronged assault into the mountains. With a British army preparing to storm Charleston, and on the heels of a Tory uprising the previous winter, South Carolina needed little urging to make a strong show of force against their Cherokee neighbors. Virginia and North Carolina also seemed little interested in fighting a two-front war and exercised a good deal of cooperation over the next few months. This spirit of mutual aid displayed itself among the commanders in the three states responsible for leading each campaign into the Cherokee lands.
As July went on, the situation on the frontier became more critical. Rutherford received more shocking information about Cherokee raids on western settlements. As Brigadier for Salisbury letters were arriving daily giving updates from settlers about the conditions on the frontier. Colonel William Graham wrote to Rutherford that he acquired information about families killed on the eastern side of the mountains. He asked for help stating “the county will be ruined if not immediate assistance.9 He told the council on July 12 that “I am applid to Daley for Relefe,” and that he needed more instructions on how to proceed. He also requested more gunpowder and salt from merchants at Cross Creek.10
Conditions had become critical in the west. Rutherford’s letter also brought the Council up to speed about the level of destruction wrought by Cherokee warriors. The Indians had moved as far east as the head of the Catawba River, near Crooked Creek. Rutherford knew the size of the Cherokee force was substantial, and that the Indians killed a Mr. Middleton. He reminded the Council that letters for relief were arriving daily, and asked for clear instructions.11
Insuring the safekeeping of the entire western quadrant of the state meant Rutherford had to keep his military district safe from foreign and domestic enemies. The serious threat from the organized Cherokee war parties represented one, but not the only threat to the safety of the frontier during the summer of 1776. Thousands of North Carolina residents refused to embrace the revolutionary government of that state when it officially broke from Great Britain that year. In the middle of Rutherford’s preparations for an expedition into the Cherokee towns, residents of the western counties brought news east that Tories remained active and a serious threat to the safety of the region. One writer even mentioned Rutherford by name, pleading to the Council to send Rutherford and some militia to put “those Rascals to death on site.” Tory threats served as an unwelcome distraction to General Rutherford. He directed the Safety Committee of his home town to arrest a John Auston from Tryon County, south of Rowan, and place him in jail.12
The Loyalist presence became an unwelcome distraction to the government of North Carolina. Indian raids however, proved to be more immediate. For planners of the expedition into Cherokee country, the facts seemed clear: British agents infiltrating the Cherokee towns were guiding Indian actions, creating havoc on the western settlers. A letter to this effect came to the attention of the leaders of North Carolina. This testimonial provided gruesome details about Alexander Cameron’s activities among the Cherokee. He instructed them to take no prisoners, kill all the white men they could, “and steel all negroes & drive away all Cattle & horses they Can find.”13
With information on supplies and intelligence pouring into Salisbury, Rutherford followed up his July 12 letter to the Council of Safety with a blunt assessment of conditions in his district. The Indians, Rutherford explained, were “making Grate prograce, in Distroying & Murdering, in the frunteers of this County.” He claimed thirty- seven settlers were killed the week before, and that a militia officer along with 120 women and children were under siege on the Catawba River. Rutherford fully expected them to perish and implored the Council to send him more supplies. Finally, he asked for men from the neighboring Hillsborough district to join the proposed expedition to the Cherokee towns. Before leaving to march a relief column to help the surrounded settlers, he asked the Council to move west to the town of Hillsborough, in an effort to speed communication.14
Idle for three months since the initial attacks, Rutherford hoped to get official sanction from the Council to proceed against the Cherokee. But with a significant group of besieged settlers facing certain doom, he obliged his natural combativeness and swung into action. He hinted at this action in his last letter to the Council and moved on the 14thof July. First marched to Quaker Meadows on the Catawba River, Rutherford’s militia pushed west to Davidson’s Fort just east of the mountains. Leaving much of his force at the fort, he traveled through the mountains against an estimated 200 warriors on the Nollichucky River. Moravian records from the summer of 1776 indicate that a battle was fought at the head of the Catawba, with casualties inflicted on both sides. Among the Indian dead were two whites, which caused a great stir among the Moravians.15 Their presence only added more ammunition to the charge that Tories and British Indian agents helped instigate and organize attacks on the settlers.
With the immediate threat to besieged settlers momentarily settled, Rutherford and the Council went about coordinating the efforts of three states to crush the Cherokee problem in the west. As he scattered Cherokee braves amassed on the Catawba, the Council of Safety for North Carolina dispatched letters to South Carolina and Virginia informing each governor of conditions on their frontier. South Carolina recently had parried a British attempt to capture Charleston and could now devote more attention to their frontier. On July 7th, General Charles Lee, commanding all troops at Charleston and John Rutledge, president of the South Carolina Council of Safety, wrote to both North Carolina and Virginia authorities stating their belief that the Cherokee had instigated nothing short of a war against the southern states. While hoping to get cooperation from her neighbors, the civil authorities in South Carolina ordered Major Andrew Williamson to attack the Lower, Middle, and Valley settlements of the Cherokee. South Carolina leaders hoped her neighbors to the north could organize an expedition against the Overhill settlements.16
In an effort to better share information between the provinces, North Carolina sent a packet of letters to both South Carolina and Virginia respecting the Indian situation. The packet contained testimonials from Rutherford and another militia colonel concerning the conduct of the Indians and the Council of Safety’s efforts to secure ammunition and supplies.17 To General Charles Lee, a General in the Continental Line, the Council of Safety pledged their cooperation, assuring Lee that in Griffith Rutherford, the western counties were in good hands. The council expressed optimism about the upcoming Cherokee expedition, telling Lee, “the Troops Brigadier Rutherford carries with him are as chosen Rifle Men as any on this Continent and are hearty and determined in the present cause. We have every expectation from them.”18
On the same day, the Council sent Rutherford news that they received his letters detailing atrocities against settlers in the west. The Council asked Rutherford to coordinate his activities with the field commanders of South Carolina and Virginia. This correspondence formally informed Rutherford that his march into Cherokee lands constituted one third of a coordinated expedition with North Carolina’s neighbors.19The Council pledged to Rutherford “every assistance” to “put an end to this cruel unjust & wicked Indian War.” Rutherford also learned more powder was coming and the letter closed by the civil authorities stating “all other matters we leave entirely to your discretion.”20
This would not entirely be the case. Throughout the beginning, middle, and end of the planning stage of his march, the Council of Safety gave specific instructions about troop dispositions, the importance of conserving supplies, and their impossible hope that a peaceful settlement might be reached. At first, when news of Indian attacks reached Halifax, the new state government acted slowly. In fact, Rutherford at first was at as loss as to how to proceed against the sporadic attacks against settlers in his district of North Carolina. It must have been fairly frustrating for Rutherford, 200miles closer to the frontier than the leaders of the state, to stand idle as Cherokee warriors could inflict terror on the frontier. Even with the swiftest horses in the colony, instructions from Halifax were slow in arriving in Salisbury, and as spring became summer, the situation looked more desperate.
Virginia already organized its part of the expedition, an attack on the Overhill towns, further west than the Valley and Lower towns that the Carolina armies planned to sweep. With this coordination in mind, the leaders of Virginia asked North Carolina for more troops. Concerned that the eastern towns might retreat and rally near the Overhill locations, Virginia requested any available North Carolina militia. Its appeal was passed to Rutherford. In addition to the men, the Committee of Safety instructed him to provide both powder and salt to the detachment sent to Virginia. Both the supplies and men constituted precious commodities for a2,000 man army about to march into hostile territory.21
General Rutherford accepted the request of the council with something less than unbridled enthusiasm. He wanted to keep men from Surry County, which bordered Virginia to the south, in North Carolina unless an expedition left for the distant Cherokee towns. With the combined expedition taking place, it seemed necessary to bring these men along. Now, however he had orders to allow them to reinforce the Virginians. Rutherford felt frustrated and expressed his aggravation on August 6th in a letter to the Council. This made Rutherford in effect responsible for a two-front war in the western counties. His responsibilities included keeping a careful watch on Loyalist activity. With this in mind, Rutherford could not recruit from the several counties that had the potential to provide able-bodied troops.22
The depletion of his army was not the only concern Rutherford shared with the council. More and more of his troops became sick with fever as the army waited for supplies from the east. He needed men and suggested 500 be raised from the Hillsborough district in the piedmont. Unfortunately for Rutherford, the Hillsborough area had a reputation for balking at civilian authority since the unrest during the Regulator movement. In fact, the problems in the district came to the attention of the government of North Carolina, which instituted court martials against the militia recruiters responsible for drafting men into service. Rutherford shared their frustration, he closed his letter, lamenting “No wonder that this and many more Distresses and Disorders should attend us, when Gentlemen to whom we ought otherwise to look up, and from whom we ought to have had many and necessary Orders have denyed their Presence.”23
With the expedition in the last stages of planning, commanders of the three armies began to coordinate their movements in an effort to inflict what they hoped would be a crushing blow to the Cherokee nation. On August 5th, Rutherford wrote William Christian, commander of the Virginia troops, hoping the three armies could meet. He planned to leave the head of the Catawba River as soon as Christian’s forces were ready. Rutherford passed along the news that Colonel Williamson of South Carolina had about 2,000men in the field and that Rutherford had attempted to coordinate the attacks with armies of both states. He closed by reminding Christian that the goal of the expeditions was to “crush that treacherous, barbarous Nation of Savages, with their white abettors, who lost to all sense of Humanity, honor and principle, mean to extinguish every spark of freedom in these United States.”24
In distant Philadelphia, on the heels of declaring the colonies of Great Britain an independent nation, North Carolina’s contingent to the Continental Congress gave their express approval of the expedition to the Cherokee towns. To help, the delegates ordered gunpowder sent to North Carolina to help the “distressed and defenceless situation” in their state. A follow up letter reminded the Council of Safety that with the eastern shore of North Carolina clear from danger, all efforts should be made against the Indians.
Their attack on the settlements, the delegates reasoned, “shuts them out from every pretension to mercy.” The Council of Safety would be failing in their duty to whites on the frontiers if they did not “carry fire and Sword into the very bowels of their country and sink them so low that they may never be able to rise and disturb the peace of their Neighbours.”25
For almost a month, Griffith Rutherford had wanted to take bold action against those who disturbed the peace on the frontier. His civilian superiors in Halifax urged caution, hoping to avoid open warfare. Now it seemed that North Carolinians in distant Philadelphia echoed the General’s sentiments. In his book on the South Carolina Cherokee, historian Thomas Hatley argues the North Carolina delegates actually envisioned a conquest of the Cherokee nation. Their letter to the leaders in North Carolina does little to mitigate this view. The delegates spoke in near-Biblical terms, believing the mission into the Cherokee towns allowed the combined armies “to extinguish the very race of them and scarce to leave enough of existence to be a vestige in proof that a Cherokee nation once was.”26
With the endorsement of both the Committee of Safety and the Delegation to the Continental Congress, Rutherford had the full support of civil authority to wage a campaign against the Cherokee villages in the mountains. After calling out the necessary number of troops from surrounding western counties, the leadership of the state procured for Rutherford the supplies and arms needed to take a substantial army into the thick woods of western Carolina.
While the expedition had been quickly organized, Rutherford still carefully went about putting in order the essential stores needed for this journey. A resident in North Carolina for over two decades, he knew the outlets for acquiring food supplies and staples needed to keep his army in the field. And in Old Fort, he chose a rallying point western settlers knew first hand. On the western extreme of white settlement, Old Fort then and now sits just east of the Swannanoa Gap, a cut in the mountains the army would have to cross in order to get into the Cherokee villages.
Like Rutherford, the commanders of the South Carolina and Virginia troops had roots in the frontier and experience as soldiers. William Christian, born in Staunton, Virginia, actually resigned his commission in the Continental Line of his home state to lead the militia against the Cherokee. Christian’s early military experience came in Dunmore’s war of 1774. Andrew Williamson also claimed the frontier as home, owning a homestead near the outpost of Ninety Six in South Carolina. Williamson first served as an officer in the Cherokee War of 1760 and later fought Loyalists in his home state in1775.27 All three men going into the woods had experience leading men in battle, and all three had knowledge of fighting an often elusive Native American force.
Plans for the expedition hoped to coordinate attacks on the Cherokee towns by three armies. The execution of the assault however failed to execute a planned pincer move that would simultaneously sweep through the Indian villages. Difficulty in eighteenth century communications combined with the fact that all three armies were not ready at the same time made the synchronization nearly impossible. Rutherford, anxious to move his army continued to be delayed by a lack of supplies. He also griped about the fact that a portion of his troops were siphoned to the Virginia forces on their march to the Overhill towns. These villages were situated farther west than the Middle and Lower towns, the target of the armies from North and South Carolina.28
As Rutherford waited for supplies at his rallying point east of the mountains, the South Carolina troops got a head start. By the middle of August, Williamson’s troops stormed into the lower towns, finding nothing more than abandoned villages. The army did not find Indians to fight or Loyalists to capture. As predicted by the civilian planners of the expeditions, Cherokee scouts learned of the South Carolinians’ approach and instructed villagers to flee across the mountains into the Overhill settlements. Williamson in a best case scenario thought he could capture Alexander Cameron, but repeatedly found the Cherokee villages empty. With Cameron gone, and the Indians scattered, the South Carolina troops went about systematically destroying crops, houses, and hundreds of abandoned deerskins. From his camp at the village of Keowee, Colonel Williamson drafted a letter to Rutherford.29
Williamson expressed his desire to meet Rutherford at the Middle settlement of Necasa on September 9th. During his time in the Lower towns, Williamson’s army made sure that “desolation is spread all over the lower towns,” and he hoped the same fate awaited the Valley and Middle settlements. In a postscript, Williamson offered Rutherford a careful assessment of the campaign in the Lower towns. The letter gave a blueprint for what the North Carolinians might expect when marching into the Middle towns.
According to Williamson Cherokee resistance proved to be scattered and inconsistent. Only a few warriors remained near the towns and these men did not seem anxious to offer Williamson’s army battle. A group of Cherokee tried to stop the South Carolinians from making a river crossing, but failed to halt their progress. On another occasion, a scouting party came under fire from warriors on hills surrounding a village. After a sharp skirmish, the Carolinians triumphed and scalped the fifteen Cherokee bodies found. Williamson’s casualties were light, one dead and several wounded, and he continued to burn dwellings and destroy all stores he found.30
Based on the subsequent actions of his army in the field, Rutherford took this advice to heart. Because he received Williamson’s letter before his own troops set off into the woods, Rutherford had ample time to consider the recommendations of his counterpart from South Carolina. Rutherford knew that speed and surprise were critical components of an army operating in hostile territory. From his years as a ranger, he absorbed the best woodland tactics of both Anglo and Indian armies. With Williamson and Christian on the move and proposing combined operations, Rutherford must have been anxious to leave.
Commanding Virginia’s troops, William Christian did his best to effect a rendezvous with Rutherford in the Overhill towns. Christian proposed a meeting on the distant Holston River, a far trek for the North Carolinians, especially considering Rutherford made meeting the South Carolinians his first priority. Nevertheless, civilian authorities knew the Cherokee would retreat to the Overhill towns after the approach of two armies from the Carolinas. In his letter to the North Carolina general, Christian gave Rutherford news from the distant north, where George Washington prepared to meet an army 20,000 strong on the islands around New York.31
At the end of August, as he waited for the last shipments of supplies, Rutherford received his final letter of direction from the Council of Safety. The Council made preparations to move to the General’s hometown of Salisbury in order to keep in closer contact with the frontier. Their latest reports indicated that the Cherokee had fled to the Overhill settlements. With this bit of information, and news that Williamson’s troops encountered only abandoned villages in the lower towns, the Council had every reason to believe that the Virginians would face the toughest opposition. Rutherford received instructions to garrison men on the frontier as a measure to protect the vulnerable western counties. With every man serving against the Cherokee, the Council reasoned, some had to be left behind to conduct a defensive-offensive strategy.32
Finally, on September 1, Rutherford and his army left the head of the Catawba River and marched west toward the Cherokee towns. The commander expressed his anxiety at the late date, giving the Council of Safety a brief description of the men and supplies he took on the expedition. Rutherford, now struck with the fever making its way through camp, estimated that he commanded 1,971 men, with a complement of eighty light horse. Following the wishes of the Council, the General left a total of about 400 men dispersed in three companies “to Range and defend the forts on the frontiers.” Though the delay in gathering supplies concerned him, Rutherford had 1,400 pack horses and over 250 drivers to supervise the movement of supplies. He conceded that the Cherokee might evacuate the Middle and Valley towns, and left open the possibility of marching into the Overhill towns. His field decisions had to do with his supplies.
Rutherford’s army carried forty days provisions, and could only operate in enemy country for as long as these stores lasted.33 A fast sweep through the Middle settlements might allow him to march further to the west. Eighty miles in the distance, through a cut in the mountains, the Cherokee Middle towns were the target of Rutherford’s army. Able to move in relative secrecy with the help of friendly Catawba Indians, the army remained free from attack during the first fifty miles of the march. With Williamson’s troops to the south hoping to rendezvous with Rutherford in the Middle towns, the commander of the expedition pushed his men. After crossing the Black Mountains at Swannanoa Gap, Rutherford wisely kept his army on the mountain rivers. After three days and thirty miles, the troops crossed the French Broad River just below present day Asheville.34
William Lenoir, an officer of Surry County, left one of only three accounts of the expedition’s progress after it departed Davidson’s fort on September 1. Like Rutherford, Lenoir had little formal education but a driving ambition. Lenoir spoke of the devastation along the Catawba as his fellow troops marched to meet Rutherford at the rallying point. His detailed diary, which notes the number of miles the army traveled each day, is the most detailed account of the North Carolinian’s progress.
Rutherford’s army faced two daunting tasks. First, they had to cross the difficult terrain of the southern Appalachians. Second, Rutherford knew speed and the element of surprise were critical for the march. The Council warned Rutherford that if the Cherokee abandoned the Middle and Valley towns, the Indians might rally in force at the Overhill villages. Civilian and military leaders held on to a sliver of hope that the army from each state taking each set of towns by surprise and defeating them.35
Less than a week into the march, Rutherford’s men made contact with Indian skirmishers. A soldier from Mecklenburg County spotted five Indians and gave chase after getting reinforced by fellow troops. The army began to run into Cherokee scouts stationed along the river paths Rutherford’s troops followed. Unable to detain the Indian scouts, the warning of the approaching army spread to the Cherokee in the Middle Towns. As the expedition approached the Tuckasegee River, Reverend James Hall shot at a black man, a trader who lived among the Indians known as John Scott. Hall mistook Scott for an Indian, a mistake which indicated the high tension within the troops on the march.36
After his first firefight over the mountains, Rutherford felt it necessary to increase the speed of his march. If Cherokee skirmishers warned the villages of the presence of his army, any element of surprise would be ruined. He detached a group of 1,000 men under his Rowan neighbor Francis Locke to race beyond the Tuckasegee and attack the Cherokee living on the outskirts of the Middle towns along the Little Tennessee River.
This advance group participated in the first pitched battle with a contingent of Cherokee. The Indians wounded one of the soldiers in the foot. William Lenoir, a part of this detachment, could not say if the Indians suffered any casualties. Most troops seemed to quarrel among themselves over who could share in the danger and participate in the action.37
The following day, this advanced group reached the Middletown of Watauga and found it deserted. On September 9, Rutherford arrived with the remainder of the army. He found that Williamson and the South Carolina troops had not arrived. Guessing Williamson to be on his way, Rutherford detached a force of 600 men to move south and look for the South Carolina army. The remaining troops began slowly to explore the towns near Nuquassee, the appointed meeting spot of the Carolina forces.38 Rutherford at this point clearly felt comfortable enough about the military situation in the Middle towns to disperse his troops into smaller units. No part of the army strayed further than a few miles apart from each other. This allowed for quick reinforcement should one section find itself in a fight. Without any concentrated force of Indians, Rutherford kept Nuquassee as his base camp and broke his army into light, fast moving strike forces.
One such force encountered strong Cherokee resistance at a place called Sugartown, a triangular shaped village on the confluence of two rivers. Indian warriors opened fire when soldiers came into the town and a rescue party of men from a neighboring town quickly came to aid the pinned down troops. The army as a whole then moved upstream along the Little Tennessee to the major Middle town village of Cowee. As William Bartram described it only a few months prior to the army’s arrival, Cowee consisted of about 100 dwellings on both sides of the river. Bartram noted substantial buildings, including a large council house “capable of accommodating several hundred people.” From Cowee, Rutherford sent another advance party north to Allejoy. This detachment of soldiers killed and scalped an Indian squaw, according to Lenoir. In an exchange of musketry, a soldier from Rowan County died on this mission.39
Harming women and children is just what the Council of Safety warned Rutherford against in a letter written after he left for the Cherokee towns. The Council reminded Rutherford that “we have to desire that you will restrain the Soldiery, from destroying the women and Children.” It was hoped Rutherford could join William Christian’s force of Virginians if the Middle and Valley towns were abandoned. Finally, the council hoped their general could construct a stockade fort on the frontier, and supply it with confiscated corn and single, unattached men who would be willing to serve there.40
Two weeks after the expedition left, Rutherford gave up waiting for Colonel Williamson. The fifteenth of September opened with a church service by Reverend James Hall conducted on an Indian temple mound in the town of Nuquasee. Afterwards, Rutherford assembled his officers for a council of war. He decided to lead a contingent of his most able bodied troops and continue west towards the Valley towns. Keeping the remainder of his corps in Nuquasee in case Williamson ever made it out of the Lower towns, Rutherford took command of a 1,200 man detachment. The troops left in good spirits and with high hopes but became hopelessly lost in the march west. Lacking an experienced guide, the troops swung too far south and strayed off the more direct route to the Valley towns. The troops grew surly as individual and small groups of Indians shot at the column. Getting lost also caused a great deal of embarrassment to the officers, and could not have instilled a great deal of confidence among the men.41
The wrong however, turn proved to be a fortunate development for the North Carolina troops. At Waya Gap, the more negotiable cut through the mountains, 500 Cherokee braves set up an ambush. This Indian force offered the most organized and concentrated resistance any of the three armies would face in the campaign. Without an experienced guide to take the army through the woods, Rutherford’s troops swung almost ten miles to the south. Though lost and facing more difficult terrain, the army avoided what could have been a significant setback.42
Williamson’s South Carolinians were less fortunate. On September 18th, his army made it to Nuquassee, nine days after the date agreed upon by the commanders. Learning from the officers in Rutherford’s army that a detachment of North Carolinians had already left for the Valley towns, Williamson immediately gathered his army and chased the North Carolinians. Williamson’s army had better luck finding the easier crossing at Waya Gap. Upon their arrival, the Cherokee sprang the trap. A sharp fight ensued. As the troops maneuvered into line of battle, both sides took casualties. The din of battle was loud enough to send a detachment of North Carolinians from Nuquassee who rushed to the sounds of musketry. The engagement ended by the time this force caught up with Williamson’s troops. Scouts around Nuquassee could find no other Indian force in the area. Losses to the South Carolinians were twelve killed and twenty wounded. The Indian losses amounted to at least fourteen dead, based on the number of bodies found on the field.43
By the time of the ambush, Rutherford had already reached the Valley town of Quanassee. Over the next week, the army raided the abandoned Valley towns, encountering little Indian resistance. Nevertheless, Rutherford remained attentive to the fact that his army was divided. His troops remained in isolated Indian country, and only through dumb luck had he missed marching into a concentrated attack of Cherokee warriors. Remaining cautious, he sent a force of 200 into Chowa, which he later reinforced by cavalry. All the while, he kept an eye out for Williamson, moving west with his force after the skirmish at Waya Gap.44
With few Indians to fight, Rutherford’s army became glorified pillagers. The detachment he led into the Valley towns methodically destroyed corn and, according to William Sharpe, “took nine Indians, and make prisoners seven white men from whom he got four Negroes.” In addition to taking winter stores, the army also confiscated gunpowder and lead, hoping to eliminate further Cherokee resistance.45
On September 26, the meeting of the Carolina armies finally took place, seventeen days after the initial plan drafted by the generals. Playing the part of upstart commander, Rutherford gathered all of his light horse cavalry in tow when Williamson entered camp. The South Carolinians received a thirteen gun salute upon their arrival. Within a short time the two commanders adjourned to discuss the next move of the combined armies. It took the men less than a day to decide that neither would continue north to the Overhill towns. Combined, the two armies had destroyed thirty-six towns in the Cherokee country. Both officers felt little need to trek across more difficult mountain passes only to have a concentrated force of Indians waiting for them. In other words, William Christian’s Virginia troops would have to go it alone. Out nearly a month, logistics also had to be considered. Taking forty days’ rations in the field, a trip into the Overhills meant living off the land. A general jeopardized the support of his men if they marched hungry.46
A trip to the Overhills risked much, for perhaps little gain. With a substantial force from the state of Virginia already in the field, it seemed risky to cross more mountainous terrain. Williamson and Rutherford learned the hard way that the further they headed into Indian territory, the more the danger. It is doubtful that either man wanted to force a march to the north and fight a combined force of warriors from the Lower, Middle, Valley, and Overhill towns. For all intents and purposes, the men accomplished the mission both outlined in the weeks before. Cherokee warriors had scattered, villages lay in ruin, and the winter food stores were either destroyed or taken. Little reason remained to stay in the mountains. Only after the expeditions safely returned was it learned that while some Indians disappeared into the mountains or into the Overhill towns, most fled to the Coosawatee River, seeking refuge with the upper Creeks.47
Following the decision to head back to their respective states, the armies parted. Though the troops were disappointed at not finding a substantial Indian force to fight, the commanders were glad to avoid a protracted, blood campaign. Rutherford decided to follow the route east that would take him through Waya Gap, where Williamson met the Cherokee ambush. The North Carolina troops were envious of the troops who had engaged in a sustained firefight and hoped to prove their own mettle. But the warriors disappeared into the woods, leaving the army to quietly pass through Waya Gap. While noting meticulously the towns and terrain he passed, William Lenoir could not help but observe “the most beautiful Valy I ‘de seen,” as the army marched east along tributaries of the Hiwassee River. As the troops passed Waya Gap, Lenoir witnessed the carnage from eleven days earlier. Some of the Indian dead were gathered and buried; others remained where they had died on the ground. By September 29th, the two sections of the army united at Nuquassee.48
From there, with little threat of attack, the army marched east back to Davidson’s Fort, the departure point almost one month before. Following the orders from the Council of Safety, Rutherford had his men carve out a road from the Cherokee towns that afterwards became known as Rutherford’s Trace. The troops moved at an amazing pace; Lenoir claimed as much as twenty-five miles during some days. Companies from Tryon and Anson County seemed to consider the return trip a race and strived to out-distance the other. William Lenoir reported in his last diary entry that he made it home on October 7th.49
On his return trip to Salisbury, Rutherford could reflect on the events of the last several months and enjoy some satisfaction. The greatest threat to the safety of his region, the Cherokee Indians, would have to endure a difficult winter short of supplies and foodstuffs. During the six weeks in the woods, Rutherford and Williamson destroyed thirty-six towns, devastating the Indian’s ability not only to make war, but to survive a Carolina winter of cold and snow. Casualties on both sides proved light - twelve Indians had been killed, while Rutherford lost only three men.50The expedition against the Cherokee towns proved to be an overwhelming success. In the months ahead, representatives of the states and the Cherokee leaders would meet to end hostilities by way of a treaty.
In the meantime, Rutherford relished his success. Responsible for the western part of the state, a charge given to him with the promotion to Brigadier, he received the gratitude of a relieved state. For his benefit, the expedition had far-reaching effects. Rutherford grew as a military leader by directing his first large scale operation. He took charge of recruitment, logistics, and direct command of men in the field for the first time. The outcome of this march into the unknown enhanced his stature among his peers.
Delegates to the state Constitutional Convention could meet with the knowledge that Rutherford left the frontier a safer place. Western counties continued to endure sporadic violence in 1777 after his army returned from the Cherokee villages, though nothing like the terror of earlier in the year. In the fall of 1776, as he prepared to assist constructing the state government, Rutherford could justifiably enter Halifax with his head high. For Rutherford, his next set of battles would move to the halls of government.
Though the Cherokee expedition consumed Rutherford in the summer and fall of 1776, his role as a soldier-politician required him to switch gears quickly. When he returned to Salisbury in October, his thoughts already drifted to politics. With the situation on the frontier momentarily stabilized, leaders of North Carolina kept one eye looking towards the west waiting for a permanent resolution to their Indian problem. In the meantime, priorities turned to politics, specifically, constructing a new government for the state of North Carolina.
As he marched his army east after laying waste to the Middle and Valley towns, the final chapter of the Cherokee war opened near the Overhill towns. William Christian took his army out of Virginia and crossed the Holston River in October 1776 just as Rutherford and Williamson left. The sporadic skirmishing he encountered with Cherokee braves led Rutherford to believe he might meet significant resistance in the towns.
Christian, however, enjoyed the advantage of having an experienced guide, the trader Isaac Thomas. Thomas directed the Virginians near the Overhill towns with expertise, putting the troops there two days before Christian anticipated.51 Aside from Thomas’s information, Christian worked with very little information. Almost six weeks had passed since Christian heard from Rutherford; he probably had no idea the North Carolinians were heading home as he inched toward the Overhill towns. His troops expected to meet a concentrated force of warriors, perhaps led by Dragging Canoe himself, but cooler heads prevailed upon the warriors to move into the mountains of Georgia and live among the Upper Creeks in north central Alabama.52
In spite of the fact that the Virginians functioned alone, the operations of the Carolina armies proved effective in cooling the war like ardor of the Overhill leaders. Christian moved into the outlying Overhill towns and quickly burned five of them. Fortunately for the Cherokee, other towns such as Chota avoided similar destruction when negotiators put a halt to hostilities. One of the village elders, Raven, sent out a flag of truce to Christian’s army, agreeing to meet the Virginia commander. Christian proved reluctant at first; he still believed a significant force of warriors had assembled to ambush his army. He also wanted Raven to deliver Alexander Cameron, “that enemy to white & red people.” But Cameron slipped out of the Overhills and fled to Creek country. Without Dragging Canoe or a British Indian agent to encourage resistance, Raven led a peace delegation hoping to spare any untouched towns.53
Ready to negotiate, Christian extracted a series of promises from Raven and the Cherokee who remained in the towns. These included promises to deliver John Stuart or Alexander Cameron. Leaders of the three states that sent armies into the Cherokee lands still operated under the assumption that these men had encouraged the initial attacks on white settlers during the previous spring. Raven’s peace feelers put a halt to further destruction. Nevertheless, the Cherokee faced a difficult winter and spring after three armies had devastated their winter food stores and scores of dwellings. Shelters could be erected quickly with efforts from the members of the tribe, but food was another matter. The combined expeditions against the towns disrupted the cycle of festivities, harvests, and hunting.54
According to the agreement between Christian and the chiefs, an exchange of prisoners would also take place as a sign of good faith between the two peoples. Christian also hoped to insure a truce by agreeing to forbid anyone entering the Overhill towns without proper authorization. This preliminary agreement began with the intention that a more permanent peace would be established by representatives of both parties during the following spring. By mid-November, with peace on the frontier, the Virginians went home.55
Conditions in the west never escaped Rutherford’s mind. Ashe served constituents in Rowan, a follow up expedition, under his orders, moved into Cherokee towns in November of 1776. William Moore led 100 Light Horse as far as the Middle town of Cowee. Moore’s men witnessed there construction of homes within the town only a few short weeks after Rutherford’s army leveled most of it. Some villagers returned but most retreated into the mountains forewarned about the approaching troops.56
This follow up foray into the Cherokee towns produced some of the uglier incidents in frontier warfare. While chasing Indians in the woods, Rutherford’s men repeatedly scalped captured Cherokee men. Captain Moore, commanding the cavalry detachment reported that Indians stole horses from his men at night. The severe act of scalping may have been in retaliation for these acts, but Moore’s report is riddled with incidents of men acting on their own, firing guns which ruined surprise attacks, and abundant plundering.
When Moore’s men finally brought in prisoners, they demanded the opportunity to sell them as slaves. Moore, probably knowing live prisoners could serve as a bargaining chip in the upcoming negotiations reminded his men that the prisoners were to be guarded and their fate decided by the civilian government of the state. Moore’s men offered their commander a difficult choice, “the Greater part swore Bloodily that if they were not sold for Slaves upon the spot, they would Kill & Scalp them immediately.” Moore acquiesced, telling Rutherford at the end of his letter that his command left him frustrated. Putting men together from different counties without a clear leader led to the incident of selling Indians into slavery. Moore wanted no further part of a second expedition with this type of command structure.57
Moore’s regret about the conduct of his men may have reminded Rutherford about his own disciplinary problems while on the march. William Lenoir, the young diarist on Rutherford’s expedition, also took note of the arbitrary way the men took life. On the same day a Rowan county man died in a firefight with Indians, men scalped a Cherokee woman. In another incident, a Mr. Roberson killed an Indian prisoner in retaliation for a family member murdered in a tribal raid. Rutherford tried to place Roberson in custody for the act, but his men became incensed at the action, and the commander released the man.58 Moore and Rutherford, commanding troops in an organized expedition tried to draw boundaries for the behavior of the soldiers. Unfortunately, their decisions could be easily overruled by a frontier sense of justice.
In the spring of 1777 when it appeared to the civilian leaders of North Carolina that full scale war with the Cherokee might start again, payment for scalps become legal. This rather macabre initiative, sanctioned by the state, hoped to enlist willing recruits to fill militia rolls.59The situation on the frontier remained tense, even after Rutherford and the combined expeditions returned. As early as February 1777, he received information about more attacks on settlers living in the Holston River. Rutherford told Governor Caswell that his source in the Indian towns, a white trader, brought him information that the Cherokee, Creek, and Chickasaw, instigated by British agent Alexander Cameron, “are determined for war.” As commander of the district, letters poured in to Rutherford asking for help, yet he hesitated to act, not knowing the extent of his authority in this situation. He also briefed Caswell about the Loyalist situation. Tories in western Surry County were organizing, and Rutherford needed instructions on how to proceed.60
Caswell, to his credit, acted quickly after Rutherford’s letter reached him. He presented to the Council of State a letter describing conditions in the Washington district. The Council directed Governor Caswell to send militia from Salisbury to the region and station three companies in the frontier counties. Rutherford obtained the legal sanction to organize militia in the newly established Washington District, the furthest extent of western settlement. Along with this authority, the Council sent a substantial amount of gunpowder from the Halifax armory.61
A continuous state of tension on the frontier illustrated the necessity of establishing a permanent peace settlement with the Cherokee. As reports of murder on the frontier and organized Tory resistance reached Caswell, the Governor realized that fighting two enemies, perhaps three if British warships appeared on the coast, demanded that one potential danger zone be eliminated. South Carolina and Virginia by the spring of 1777 started efforts to make a permanent peace with the Cherokee. During the spring of the year skirmishes between white militia and Indians continued as Virginia and South Carolina dispatched commissioners to establish a permanent treaty with the Cherokee elders.62The end result, a treaty at Long Island of Holston, ended hostilities between the two nations and ceded Cherokee land east of the Blue Ridge Mountains to the state of North Carolina. One stipulation of the treaty also limited white access to Overhill towns.63
After the treaty was signed in the summer of 1777,commissioners from North Carolina urged Rutherford to meet with Indian representatives and appoint a commissary to the Cherokee who would provide supplies to the nation for the upcoming winter. In spite of this stipulation within the treaty, representatives from the state government complained about Rutherford’s reluctance to hold talks with Cherokee representatives. The conference, according to commissioner Waightstill Avery, would show the Indians that Rutherford served as “Head War Captain over all the Warriors in the West End of North Carolina.” In other words, it became important to Avery that Rutherford show himself to the Cherokee and make it clear that “all other Captains and Warriors in these parts must obey him.” Rutherford seemed unmoved by this situation and hesitated in only in meeting with the Cherokee Leaders, but also in appointing a commissary to the Cherokee nation.64
Unfortunately for all parties involved, commissioners from the three states made settlements with a divided nation. Even as the tribal elders signed treaties, they could make no promises to bring Dragging Canoe and his 400 braves to the meetings. In spite of the fact that North Carolina, Virginia, and South Carolina had made peace with three sets of Indian towns, the younger, militant warriors continued the battle, forcing North Carolina and Virginia to take another militia force into the Georgia frontier in 1778.65
The increasing number of settlers in western areas presented two concerns for the state of North Carolina. First, as the summer and fall of 1776 indicated, the encroachment of white settlers on Indian land forced the state to deal harshly with its Cherokee neighbors. Secondly, the territory would have to be organized. In the midst of putting together the expedition against the Cherokee, which consumed the Council of Safety, settlers on the Watauga and Holston rivers on the western side of the mountains sought the protection of the government of North Carolina. To secure it they applied to the state as the Washington District. With their attention squarely on making preparations for Rutherford’s expedition into the Cherokee lands, the Council of Safety nevertheless approved the petition of the Washington District in August of 1776. The area became integrated into the state by a vote in the Fifth Provincial Congress in November of that year.66
FOOTNOTES
1 Robert L. Ganyard, “Threat From the West: North Carolina and the Cherokee, 1776-1778,” North Carolina Historical Review 45 (January 1968): 49.
2 Fries, ed., Moravian Diary, April 13, 1776,3:1061.
3 Ashe, “Rutherford’s Expedition Against the Indians,”11.
4 Thomas Jones to James Iredell, July 23, 1776 in Don Higginbotham ed., The Papers of James Iredell, 1751-1799 (Raleigh: Division of Archives and History,1976), 1: 415.
5 Moravian Diary, July 6, 1776, 3:1065.
6 Committee of Safety to Griffith Rutherford, June 24,1776, NCCR, 11: 303.
7 Ibid., 303-304.
8 Ganyard, “Threat From the West,” 56; Rutherford to Council of Safety, July 5, 1776, NCCR,10: 652.
9 William Graham to Gen. Rutherford, July 3, 1776, NCSR, 22: 778.
10 Rutherford to Council, July 12, 1776, NCCR, 10:662.
11 Ibid.
12 Ransom Southerland to Council of Safety, July 13, 1776, NCCR, 10:664;Proceedings of the Safety Committee in Rowan County, July 13, 1776 in ibid.,667.
13 Letter from Charles Roberson and James Smith, July 13,1776, in NCCR, 10:665-666
14 Rutherford to the Council of Safety, July 14, 1776, NCCR, 10: 669.
15 Ashe, 13-14; Fries, Moravian Records, 3: 1070,1099.
16 Ganyard, 56.
17 Council of Safety to President of the Virginia Convention and Governor John Rutledge, July 13, 1776, NCSR, 11: 313-314.
18 Ganyard, 57; Council of Safety to General Lee, July16, 1776, NCSR, 11:316.
19 Letter Sent Genl. Rutherford Respecting Indians, July 16, 1776, NCSR, 11: 317.
20 Council of Safety to Rutherford, July 21, 1776, NCSR,11: 318-319.
21 Ganyard, 57-58;Council of Safety to President Page of Virginia, July 30, 1776, NCCR,10: 680.
22 Rutherford to Council of Safety, August 6, 1776, NCCR,10: 727.
23 Ibid; Minutes of Council of Safety, August 23, 1776, NCCR,10: 703-704.
24 Rutherford to William Christian, August 5, 1776, NCCR,10: 650-51. The letter is dated July 5th, but since Rutherford mentions his approval to march from the Council of Safety, the letter is probably from August 5.
25 Letter from the North Carolina Delegates in the Continental Congress to the North Carolina Council of Safety, August 6, 1776, NCCR, 10: 727-728; Ibid to the North Carolina Provincial Council, August 7, 1776, NCCR, 10: 730-731.
26 Thomas M. Hatley, Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians Through the Era of Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 193; North Carolina Delegates in the Continental Congress to the North Carolina Provincial Council, August 7, 1776, NCCR,10: 731.
27 J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton, ed., “Revolutionary Diary of William Lenoir,” William and Mary Quarterly 6 (May 1940): 250.
28 Ganyard, 58; James H. O’Donnell, The Cherokees of North Carolina in the American Revolution (Raleigh: Division of Archives and History, 1976), 18.
29 O’Donnell, 18.
30 Colonel Andrew Williamson to Griffith Rutherford, August 14, 1776, NCCR, 10: 745-747.
31 Colonel William Christian to the Commander of the South Carolina Troops, August 15, 1776, NCCR, 10: 748; Christian to General Griffith Rutherford, August 18, 1776, ibid, 751.
32 General Rutherford from Council of Safety, August 23,1776, NCSR, 11: 346.
33 Griffith Rutherford to Council of Safety, September 1, 1776, NCCR, 10: 788-89.
34 O’Donnell, The Cherokees of North Carolina in the American Revolution, 19; Ashe, 15; Douglas Summers Brown, The Catawba Indians, The People of the River (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1966), 48; Roy S. Dickens Jr., “The Route of Rutherford’s Expedition Against the North Carolina Cherokees” Southern Indian Studies 19(October 1967): 6.
35 O’Donnell, Southern Indians in the American Revolution (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1973), 46.
36 William Lenoir Diary, 254-255; Ashe, 16; Dickens, 6.
37 Lenoir, 255;Letter from the North Carolina Council of Safety to Governor Patrick Henry, of Virginia, October 25, 1776, in NCCR, 10: 860. This letter contains a report from William Sharpe, a member of the Council of Safety who accompanied Rutherford on the expedition. Hereafter cited as Sharpe’s Report.
38 Lenoir, 255.
39 Mark Van Dorened., Travels of William Bartram (New York: Dover, 1928), 296-297;Lenoir, 255.
40 Letter to General Rutherford from Council of Safety, September 11, 1776, NCSR, 11: 350-351.
41 Lenoir, 266-256,Sharpe’s Report, 860.
42 Dickens, 13.
43 Pension Statement of James Martin, in NCSR, 22: 146; Ganyard, 60.
44 Lenoir, 256.
45 Sharpe’s Report,861; Ganyard, 60.
46 Lenoir, 257;Ganyard, 60.
47 Sharpe’s Report, 861.
48 Lenoir, 257.
49 Ashe, 20; Lenoir, 257; Dickens, 18.
50 Ganyard, 60;North Carolina Council of Safety to Governor Patrick Henry, of Virginia, October 25, 1776, NCCR, 10: 860-861.
51 William Christian to Patrick Henry, October 6, 1776, NCCR, 10: 837-838;O’Donnell, Southern Indians in the American Revolution, 48.
52 O’Donnell, The Cherokees of North Carolina in the American Revolution, 20.
53 William Christian to Patrick Henry, October 14, 1776, NCCR, 10: 844-845;O’Donnell, Southern Indians in the American Revolution, 48.
54 James H. O’Donnell, “The Southern Indians in the War for American Independence, 1775-1783,” in Four Centuries of Southern Indians, ed. Charles M. Hudson (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1975), 51;O’Donnell, Cherokees of North Carolina, 20.
55 O’Donnell, Southern Indians in the American Revolution, 49; Ashe, “Rutherford’s Expedition Against the Indians, 1776,”21.
56 Report of Captain Moore to General Rutherford, November 17, 1776, NCCR, 10: 895-898.
57 Ibid; Ashe, “Rutherford’s Expedition Against the Indians, 1776,” 23-24.
58 Lenoir Diary, 255; Hatley, Dividing Paths, 201.
59 Ganyard, “Threat From the West,” 62; “An Act for the Encouragement of the Militia and Volunteers employed in prosecuting the present Indian War,” NCSR, 24: 15.
60 Gov. Caswell From Griffith Rutherford, February 1,1777, NCSR, 11: 372.
61 Council of State Journal, February 5, 1777, NCSR,22: 912-913.
62 Gov. J. Rutledge to Gov. Caswell, March 10, 1777, NCSR,11: 417; Charles Robertson to Gov. Caswell, April 27, 1777, NCCR, 11:458-460.
63 Ganyard, 64.
64 Waightstill Avery to Gov. Caswell, September 5, 1777, NCSR,11: 608; Avery to the Governor Concerning Cherokee Indians, September 15, 1777,ibid: 763-764.
65 John R. Alden, A History of the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1969), 428; Galloway, American Revolution in Indian Country, 200.
66 Ganyard, “Threat From the West,” 61.